Secret theft
| Rule | Severity | Detects |
|---|---|---|
secret-exfiltration | critical or high | Critical: a step uses secrets and contacts a hardcoded IP, a throwaway IP hostname or a webhook or paste service. High: many secrets posted in one request, as GhostAction did |
all-secrets-serialized | critical | toJSON(secrets), which puts every secret into one value. Used by the Shai-Hulud worm |
environment-dump | high | The whole environment piped into an encoder or network tool |
log-masking-bypass | high | Secrets encoded, or output double base64 encoded, so GitHub’s log masking does not hide them |
runner-memory-read | critical | Reads Runner.Worker process memory, as in the tj-actions compromise |
history-secret-harvest | critical | Searches full git history (fetch-depth: 0 with git log -p, or TruffleHog and Gitleaks) and sends data out |
remote-script-execution | high | Pipes a script from a gist, paste site or IP address into a shell |
campaign-indicator | critical | Contains an indicator from a tracked campaign |
hardcoded-secret | critical | A credential in AWS, GitHub, Slack, Stripe or private key format |
Malicious or risky actions
| Rule | Severity | Detects |
|---|---|---|
malicious-action-commit | critical | Pinned to a commit known to contain malicious code |
action-owner-lookalike | high | Action owner is one character away from a popular owner, such as actons for actions |
action-owner-unclaimed | critical | The owner account does not exist. Anyone can register it and publish code under that action name |
action-repository-missing | high | The owner exists but the repository does not |
new-action-repository | high | Action repository was created recently |
forked-action | medium | Action repository is a fork, often of the action it imitates |
action-repository-moved | medium | Repository was renamed or transferred. The old name can be reclaimed |
archived-action | low | Repository is archived |
obscure-action | low | Young repository with very little adoption |
unpinned-action | high, medium or low | Referenced by tag or branch instead of a commit SHA. High for branches, low for GitHub-maintained actions |
Injection and privilege
| Rule | Severity | Detects |
|---|---|---|
untrusted-checkout | critical | Pull request code checked out in a pull_request_target or workflow_run workflow |
script-injection | critical or high | Attacker-controlled values such as issue titles or branch names interpolated into run or github-script. Critical under privileged triggers |
self-hosted-runner | high or medium | Self-hosted runner reachable from issues and discussions (high, the Shai-Hulud 2.0 backdoor) or from pull requests (medium) |
credential-persistence | high | Artifact upload that may include the token stored by actions/checkout |
insecure-commands | high | ACTIONS_ALLOW_UNSECURE_COMMANDS enabled |
excessive-permissions | high or medium | permissions: write-all |
secrets-inherit | medium | secrets: inherit passed to an external reusable workflow |
default-permissions | medium or low | No permissions block |
Run history
These only appear in Scan recent runs:workflow-removed-after-run, run-commit-rewritten, campaign-workflow-file and campaign-branch.